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RECENT CASES
balanced against the policies within the concept of joint ownership
expressed in Section 7(2) of the Act. Courts have seemingly found
little difficulty in absolving joint purchasers of land from liability as
partners, even where there existed profit-sharing agreements. If, as
appears to be the case, these decisions are based on the intent of the
parties, it would seem only proper to apply the same criteria to joint
heirs of land. While they may clearly become partners if they choose
to do so, an absence of manifested intent to become partners should
protect them at least to the same extent as those who voluntarily as-
sume joint ownership of property.
Henry R. Snyder
PAnTNmis=m-xirrs Am Lrirrxms As To TmiD PERSONS-ESTOPPEL
AS BAsIs OF L ikmnrY-The defendant and another procured from the
State of Ohio a vendor's license in the name of "Henry F. Lucas and
Clarence F. Roy, DBA F. & M. Truck Stop". The license application
was signed by both men, and the license was posted at the place of
business. Plaintiff sued for the amount of goods sold and delivered to
Lucas, alleging liability of the defendant as a member of a partner-
ship. Defense: the evidence did not disclose that the plaintiff was
aware of, or relied upon, the information contained in the vendor's
license. The trial court rendered judgment for the amount claimed.
Held: Affirmed: The court below properly found the defendant liable
as a partner. In arriving at its decision, the Appellate Court relied
upon section 16 of the Uniform Partnership Act,' finding that posting
of the license was in itself sufficient to establish defendant's liability
to third persons. Brown and Bigelow v. Roy, 132 N.E. 2d 755 (Ohio
App. 1955)
It was well-established at common law that where one has con-
sented to be held out as a partner, or holds himself out as a partner,
he will be liable, under the doctrine of estoppel, to third parties ex-
tending credit on the basis of such representations.2 It was not so clear,
however, as to whether a person unaware of being thus held out had
an affirmative duty, upon discovery of the holding out, to disclaim the
reputed partnership.3 This question is apparently resolved today in
1 Page's Ohio Rev. Code Ann., sec. 1775.15 (1954). The Act became effec-
tive in Ohio on October 1, 1953.
240 Am. Jur. sec. 76 (1942); Mechem, Partnership 90 (2d ed. 1920).
3 E. L. Martin & Co. v. A. B. Maggard & Son, 206 Ky. 558, 267 S.W. 1102
(1925), where a father was liable for debts contracted by his son in a store busi-
ness carried on in the names of both as partners, after he knew that the business
was being so carried on, and when he took no action until creditors were suing
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those states which have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act,4 since
the Commissioners have stipulated that, under the Act, one who is
held out as a partner is liable to third persons only where he in fact
consented to such holding out,5 the question of fact being for the jury
The problem of "partnership by estoppel" is treated in section 16
of the Act as follows:
When a person, by words spoken or written or by conduct,
represents himself, or consents to another representing him to any
one, as a partner in an existing partnership or with one or more persons
not actual partners, he is liable to any such person to whom such
representation has been made, who has, on the faith of such repre-
sentation given credit to the actual or apparent partnership, and if he
has made such representation or consented to its being made in a
public manner he is liable to such person, whether the representation
has or has not been made or communicated to such person so giving
credit by or with the knowledge of the apparent partner making the
representation or consenting to its being made.... :6
This section of the Act apparently embodies the three factors which
at common law were necessary to establish liability to a third party
under the doctrine of estoppel: (1) a holding out by the party charged
or one acting under his authority or with his consent, (2) reliance
thereon by the third party and (3) action, to his detriment, by the
third party so relying.7 Thus, regardless of whether or not one has an
affimative duty to deny existence of his purported status as a partner,
he cannot be made liable to a third party who acted without reliance
on the representations made to him.8
The latter part of the section quoted above, however, is drafted
in a somewhat ambiguous manner. A casual reading conveys the im-
pression that representation of partnership status "made in a public
manner" is sufficient to establish liability to the creditor with or
for unpaid bills. Speer v. Bishop, 24 Ohio St. 598 (1874). Cf. Thompson v.
Toledo First Nat. Bank, 111 U.S. 529, 28 L. Ed. 507 (1884); Morgan v. Farrell,
58 Conn. 413, 20 A. 614 (1890). See also Crane, Partnership 169 (Hornbook
Series, 2d ed. 1952).
4 See Ky. Rev. Stat. see. 362.150 to sec. 362.360 (1956). The Act became
effective in Kentucky on June 17, 1954. (Ky. Rev. Stat. are hereinafter cited as
KRS.)
57 U.L.A. 95 (1949). But cf. McBriety v. Phillips, 180 Md. 569, 26 A. 2d
400 (1942), decided under the Act, which imposed an affirmative duty upon the
person so held out to deny his purported status as a partner. A note in 6 Md. L.
Rev. 337 (1942) suggests that the decision was not intended to indicate a general
rule, but rather, that a duty of affirmative denial may arise in specific instances.
to decide.
6 KRS sec. 362.225(1) (1956).
7 Sparks & Co. v. Hawks, 42 N.M. 636, 83 P. 2d 981 (1938).
8 In re Ganaposki, 27 F. Supp. 41, 42 (M.D. Penna. 1939); West Side Trust
Co. v. Gascoigne, 39 N.J. Super. 467, 121 A. 2d 441 (1956); Cooper v. Knox, 197
Va. 602, 90 S.E. 2d 844 (1956).
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without knowledge of the holding out. Closer examination, in light of
the entire section, indicates a different interpretation. In effect, this
portion of the section provides that representation of partnership status,
made in a public manner, creates liability to a creditor, whether or not
the person held out knew of the representations, but only if there exist
the three factors enumerated above. In other words, even though the
holding out is done in a public manner, the third party creditor must,
to recover, have acted in reliance on the representations, and suffered
damage as a result.9
The necessity for a finding of the third party's actual reliance
upon such holding out was not always so firmly established, and at
least a few early cases held that there might be a "holding out to the
world", so that anyone who had given credit to the purported partner
might recover, even though he knew nothing of the holding out at the
time he extended credit.'0 This theory apparently gained few ad-
herents, and has been effectively repudiated by subsequent cases."
The requirement that, before estoppel will be invoked, credit must
have been given on the faith of the act of holding out appears to be
consistently applied in the more recent cases. In Cooper v. Knox'2 a
third party, as plaintiff, was precluded from asserting partnership by
estoppel against a wife who was active in her husband's business on
the ground, inter alia, that the plaintiff had never relied upon any
statements made by the wife when he extended credit to the business.
The necessity of proving reliance prevailed over the fact that the wife
clearly appeared to be a driving force in the business, and was
responsible to a considerable degree for its success.
A more rigorous application of the "reliance factor" appears in
Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Lehmann.'3 There, the defendant had
formerly been engaged with his son in conducting a partnership, and
subsequently the two men operated separate businesses on the father's
farm. The son changed his telephone listing from his own name to
that of the defendant's sole proprietorship, which bore the name,
"W. R. Lehmann & Son-Dairy Cattle". Subsequently he failed to pay
his telephone bill. The jury found that the defendant was responsible
for the misleading appearances and that there was reasonable ground
0 This interpretation of sec. 16 of the Act was followed in Orofino Rochdale
Co. v. Fred A. Shore Lumber Co., 48 Idaho 425, 252 P. 487 (1927). West Side
Trust Co. v. Gascoigne; Cooper v. Knox, supra note 8.
10 Poillon v. Secor, 61 N.Y. 456 (1875); Rizer & Co. v. James, 26 Kan. 221,
224 (1881).
"1 See, for example, Thompson v. Toledo First Nat. Bank, 111 U.S. 529, 28
L. Ed. 507 (1884); also Bates v. Simpson, 239 P. 2d 749 (Utah, 1952).
12 197 Va. 602, 90 S.E. 2d 844 (1956).
13 80 N.W. 2d 267 (Wis. 1957).
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for the plaintiff's employees to believe that the defendant and his son
were partners. Nevertheless, judgment for the plaintiff in the lower
court was reversed, and the complaint was ordered dismissed, since
the plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence that it changed its position
to its detriment in reliance on the belief of existence of a partnership.14
Such a result seems to be proper under the provisions of sub-
section 2 in section 16 of the Act, which emphasizes that,
When a person has been thus represented to be a partner
in an existing partnership ... he is an agent of the persons consenting
to such representation to bind them ... with respect to persons who
rely upon the representation .... 15
Thus, it seems clear that the necessity for the third party creditor
to prove his reliance upon the alleged misrepresentations of partner-
ship status is fully established under the Act. In absence of proof of
such reliance, the person giving credit cannot make out a case for
recovery.
In the principal case, the court apparently felt that the posting of
the vendor's license was an act of so public a nature as to of itself in-
voke the operation of estoppel. The theory that there can be a "hold-
ing out to the world", creating liability to any creditor, is, as we have
seen, no longer given effect under the Act. While the language
of section 16 of the Act is ambiguous, creating the initial impression
that a public holding out establishes liability to all third party creditors,
it nonetheless preserves the requirement that there be reliance on the
alleged representations, with resultant detriment to the creditor, be-
fore recovery will be permitted. The opinion of the principal case
makes it clear that no evidence of such reliance was presented by the
plaintiff. For that reason alone, it is submitted that the decision was
unfortunate in its interpretation of the Act.
Henry R. Snyder
14 The case was decided under sec. 16 of the Act. See Wis. Stat., see. 123.13
(1955). The Act became effective in Wisconsin on July 6, 1915.
15 .RS sec. 362.225(2) (1956).
